that Sinkiang was placed under a form of administration comparable to that of other Chinese provinces. In 1884 it ceased to be a possession, and became a Chinese province. 175

Under the Chinese Republic, since 1911, Sinkiang has continued to be nominally a province like any other province; but in actuality the tendency of governors of the province has always been to rule as independent war lords. Sometimes this independence has been carried so far that governors have conducted their own foreign relations with Russia and India and have even treated the National Government of China almost as if it were a foreign power. China's present problem in Sinkiang is how to deal with the relations between the Chinese provincial authorities and the national government, the relations of both the provincial authorities and the national government with Russia and India, especially Russia, and the effort of both provincial and national Chinese authorities to maintain themselves in the face of the nationalist demands of the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. 175 186 668

Nationalism in Sinkiang is a modern outgrowth of traditional Mohammedan and tribal rebellions against Chinese rule. It began to take newer forms in the 1930's, when Sinkiang fell under the rule of a Chinese military adventurer named Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Since Sheng could not call on China for military reinforcements for fear of being supplanted, he followed a new policy of seeking support from each subject nationality separately, while at the same time preventing any coalition of nationalities. He also increased trade with the Soviet Union, obtained Soviet loans, and sent Uighur and other students to the Soviet Union for technical training. In 1943 he broke with the Russians and came to terms with the National Government of China. A policy of "firmness" toward the non-Chinese peoples was then reasserted; but in the meantime political nationalism had taken root. 186 668

There are now two major nationalist movements in Sinkiang. One follows a policy of "Sinkiang for the Uighurs." It seeks to win autonomy from the Chinese and at the same time to assert

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186 668 Uighur domination over the other peoples of Sinkiang. The second movement is the "coalition nationalism," whose stronghold is at Kulja. It seeks to unite all nationalities in Sinkiang; it is as friendly to the Soviet Union as was the Azerbaijan nationalist movement in Iran, and some of its leaders were born or educated in Soviet territory.

### *Forces Converging on the Center of Gravity*

000 China's colonial problems in inner Asia are enclosed in a framework of great power politics. The political interests of America and Britain are sensitive to changes in the area in which the territorial frontiers of China and Russia meet in Inner Asia.

Until the Age of Columbus the movement of man within the land mass between the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the Polar Sea, was more important than his enterprises on salt water. Coastal voyages were made, and early navigators crossed the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, and perhaps even the Pacific; certainly the Pacific Islands were reached from Asia; but the major interaction of cultures and the building of the great civilizations took place within the Eurasian land mass and in North Africa.

With the great voyages of navigation and circumnavigation at the end of the fifteenth century, a new mode of history began. The peopling of North America, the colonizing of Central and South America, and the conquest of India and Southeast Asia were the work of Western European man, moving across the oceans. Inner Asia, once a crossroads of the world, became a stagnant area of secondary commercial and strategic importance.

Then there came a period of fifty years, from 1580 to 1630, in which the histories of different parts of the world began to flow together as components of a true world history. In 1580 Yermak began the Russian drive into Siberia, sponsored by merchants interested in the expansion of the fur trade. After 1595, when Boris Godunov founded a gun-making industry at Tula, the eastward

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writer. From Lanchow along the "panhandle" of Kansu, across the main desert gap and on to Urumchi, the distance is nearly 2000 miles. Yet a blockhouse was maintained about every twenty miles along the route. Supplies and transport were kept moving only by heavy requisitions in kind and in labor from the sparse population. The troops, who themselves were not well treated, were not under good discipline, and when turned loose they treated the people even worse.[62]

Chinese colonization has resulted in the addition of very few owner-cultivators. Many famine refugees have died even after their arrival in Sinkiang, and in the cities and towns there has been a great increase in the number of beggars and thieves.[63] Heavy taxation and inflation stimulated bitter hatred against the Chinese, accompanied by much resentment even among Chinese against the political regime. As one American reporter observed, "to save Sinkiang, China would have to make spectacular reforms on a scale unknown in the Orient. But even if this were possible and if it were done, China's efforts might break down against the barrier of emotion"—meaning the aroused nationalism of the Uighurs.[64]

In the rivalry for power in Sinkiang in the last years of Kuomintang rule, the C.C. Clique had the upper hand over the Political Science Group most of the time. It was able to use, in succession, an old-line bureaucrat like Wu Chung-hsin, a general like Chang Chih-chung, and a wealthy Uighur landlord member of the Kuomintang like Masud Sabri.

Wu Chung-hsin, long associated with the C.C. Clique, long active in frontier affairs, and long distrusted by Mongols and Tibetans, was appointed provincial Chairman in October 1944. Though a graduate of the Paoting Military Academy, his most important posts had been in the Civil Service. He was Governor of Anhui, his native province, in 1929, Governor of Kweichow

[62] Chung Shih, "The Puzzle in Sinkiang," in *Min Chu* (*Democracy*, weekly), Shanghai, March 16, 1946, Nos. 21–22 joint issue (in Chinese).

[63] Ch'en Ssu-ying, "Agriculture in Sinkiang," in *Central Bank Monthly*, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 6, Shanghai, June, 1946 (in Chinese).

[64] Frank Robertson.

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*175 from reason and less like a hopeful, though cautious, approach toward reason. First deadlock and then crisis developed in the early months of 1947.

*175 186 In February of that year Akhmedjan declared that "the expression 'Eastern Turkistan' does not mean that we advocate an independent Eastern Turkistan. It means solely that the people have finished with the former policy of oppression and do not want it to continue. . . . The problem of our day is the confirmation of national unity [i.e. the unity of the "nationalities" of Sinkiang] and the putting into action of the democratic policy." He put forward his program under three headings: unification of all the peoples of the province; executive power to rest with the Uighurs and other non-Chinese nationalities, except for defense; and a Kurultai, or assembly of the nationalities of the province, to be the supreme judiciary body. He declared that in Sinkiang the supremacy of any one nationality was not needed. "The condition for peace and unity is unity of the nationalities and a democratic policy. This is written in the Kulja Declaration." [84]

Akhmedjan made the accusation, supporting it with considerable detail, that in many oases of the Tarim Basin elections had been interfered with by the police and the Chinese troops. People were beaten, students and teachers imprisoned, meetings forbidden or broken up, and once the military even boasted that they had the atom bomb with which to destroy Sinkiang.[85] While making a stand against Chinese claims to arbitrary authority, however, and by clear implication against the C.C. Clique influence in Sinkiang policy, Akhmedjan held out the possibility of reconciliation between the Chinese people as a whole and the non-

[84] The full text of this speech was published in *Sinkiang Gezeti*, Uighur language edition, Urumchi, February 19, 1947. Owing presumably to Chinese Government pressure, it does not appear to have been published in Chinese.

[85] The attitude of some of the Chinese military at this time was typified by the warning of Sung Hsi-lien, then the top military commander in Sinkiang: "If our first enemy is the Kulja party, our second is the nationalist group. The nationalists had better forget their slogan 'Turkistan first' or there will be trouble." See dispatch from Frank Robertson, *New York Times*, February 1, 1948.

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Chinese of Sinkiang. "In this province," he declared, "it is impossible to maintain peace by means of persecution, corruption, trickery, and fraud"; but on the other hand "the enemies of our people are not the Chinese nation, but those individuals who advocate oppressive government, who want imperialist policies, who are against rights for the people." [86]

In April 1947 Chang Chih-chung made a tour of the most important oases of the Tarim Basin. In May, fortified presumably by the firsthand knowledge he had acquired, he made an important speech at Urumchi in which he put forward a Chinese policy countering the policy of Akhmedjan. There should, he pleaded, be no resort to revolution. Theoretically, Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic system of rule; but autonomy and democracy should be based on a choice between the Sun Yat-sen pattern and the Soviet pattern. The Kulja group, he asserted, because of its opposition to the Chinese Government, must be regarded as opposing the San Min Chu I or Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, and must therefore be pro-Communist.

General Chang also dealt with a number of the substantive issues standing between the Chinese Government and the Kulja group. Akhmedjan, as the spokesman of the Kulja group, was willing to recognize the right of the Chinese Government to control the national defense of Sinkiang. General Chang, however, contended that reorganization of the six regiments in the three frontier regions of Kulja, Chuguchak, and the Altai district should be preceded by the complete surrender of those regiments to the Chinese forces. His demand in this respect was parallel to that of the Chinese Government in its 1945–1946 negotiations with the Chinese Communists, through the Marshall Mission: the Communists offered to reduce their forces and to place them under a united high command, but demanded that their identity as units be preserved and that the units continue to be stationed in Communist districts; the National Government insisted on its right not only to take over such forces but to disperse or reassign them.

[86] Akhmedjan, in the speech cited above.

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the frequently loose and unscientific use of terms by foreign travelers and, much more important, by political motives on the part of Chinese administrators and Turkic nationalist leaders.

It is paradoxical that the sorting out of the peoples of Sinkiang is made more difficult by the fact that there is a rich Russian and Western literature about Sinkiang. For nearly a century there has been incessant publication of books about Inner Asia by explorers, archaeologists, geographers and casual travelers. Unfortunately, in the greater part of the foreign literature the descriptions of racial type, national grouping and political affiliation are excessively loose. For example, an American writer refers to the "distinctly Aryan" features of a regional group, to a "Kirghiz race," and to evidence of "Turkish and Mongol blood" in Kashgar.[5] "Aryan" can only be used properly in the description of languages, not of races, and even as a linguistic term it has now largely been abandoned, while peoples who speak the Turkish, Kirghiz, or Mongol languages may be of the most various and mixed origin.

Loose terminology in the foreign literature leads merely to misunderstanding or irritation, but it is politically dangerous when it is used to clothe the theories of administrators who are in a position to act. Contemporary Chinese political theories applied to concepts of race and nationality are of critical importance where Chinese administrative policy is confronted at every turn by growing nationalist movements which compete both with each other and with the projects of Chinese politicians. It is therefore essential to sort out the terms used both by Chinese administrators and by nationalist leaders, before attempting an accurate and rational classification of the many peoples who make up the population of Sinkiang.

In China, attempts to classify the peoples of Sinkiang in ways which reinforce political theories have led to four main trends.

The first trend is called *Ta Han Chu-i*, the "Greater Chinese Theory," by the Chinese who do not support it, and by Mongol, Uighur, and other nationalists who fear it. According to this defi-

[5] William James Morden, *Across Asia's Snows and Deserts*, New York, London, 1927.

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nition, all non-Chinese groups within the political frontiers of China are mere subvarieties of an ancient "greater Chinese" race, and should be absorbed into a standardized Chinese race. This trend was pushed by right-wing groups, during the period of Kuomintang ascendancy, who aimed at building up an uncompromising, militant, and expansionist ideology.

The second trend rejects the idea of forced assimilation and stresses instead a program of cultural diversity. It may therefore be labeled as "cultural autonomy." Its main exponents were Sheng Shih-ts'ai, former Governor of Sinkiang, and Chang Chih-chung, the chief Kuomintang emissary to the province after Sheng's withdrawal.

The third trend, which may be called "Pan-Turkish nationalism," emphasizes the fact that the majority of the population in Sinkiang speaks Turkic languages and belongs to the Moslem faith. It is most actively promoted by an Uighur group which has some Kazakh allies.

The fourth trend incorporates the idea of territorial as well as cultural autonomy and hence may be described simply as "federalism." It derives its ideas from Soviet nationality policy and is actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists, but has a considerable appeal to non-Communist, non-Chinese national minorities which would like to maintain their national identities but to live in harmony with the Chinese in a common state. It also has an appeal to moderate and liberal groups in and out of the Kuomintang, and would have been more widespread if it had not been for fear of the consequences of consenting to any part of the Communist program.

The foremost exponent of the "Greater Chinese Theory" has been Chiang Kai-shek. In his *China's Destiny*, as officially translated, all the people in China are mentioned as belonging to a single "Chunghua (Chinese) nation."[6] This "nation" is said to be made up of a number of groups which are described in the authorized translation as "stocks." In Chiang's opinion the differ-

[6] Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, New York, 1947, p. 3. Parentheses in original text of translation.

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ences among these "stocks" are limited to habits, customs, religious beliefs, and geographical environment, and do not include race or blood. "In short," he says, "the various stocks in China constitute not only one nation but also one race." [7]

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The generalized statements about race and nation made in *China's Destiny* have been applied to the nationality problems of Sinkiang by a writer belonging to the Kuomintang C.C. Clique, a tightly organized political machine whose political creed was to give extreme authoritarian interpretations of every opinion or theory uttered by Chiang Kai-shek. Following his terminology, the C.C. theorist divides the peoples of Sinkiang into fourteen "stocks." He then concludes that since they are not separate nationalities but merely "stocks" of a single "nation," therefore they are not entitled to separate political recognition, a thesis which other writers have extended into the cultural field as well. He proposes that "self-government" in Sinkiang should be based on small geographical units, the counties, regardless of differences between the peoples inhabiting these administrative units. In order to make impossible any other interpretation of the term for "self-government," he rejects, in so many words, the identification of "self-government" with "freedom" or "independence." [8]

In contrast to the rigidly assimilative approach of the C.C. extremists is the policy adopted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai when he was military dictator of Sinkiang. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 Sheng took into his administration a National Salvationist who appears to have been instrumental in elaborating for him a policy intended to effect a compromise between the Chinese monopoly of the provincial administration and the stirrings of nationalism among the non-Chinese peoples.

The National Salvationists in China at that time represented a point of view rather than a political organization. In face of the emergency created by the Japanese danger they believed in effecting the widest possible political coalitions and in taking the

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 13. The Chinese term for "nation" or "nationality" is *min-tsu*, and for "stock," *tsung-tsu*, also often translated as "clan."

[8] *Cf.* articles by Li Tung-fang in *Altai*, I, No. 2, Chungking, April 25, 1945, pp. 8–9 and pp. 15–18.

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territory and sovereignty of the nation suffer no impairment thereby. The Central Government will not tolerate anything possibly detrimental to the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the State — even at the cost of a war.[12]

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In opposition to the foregoing Chinese policies stands the "Pan-Turkic nationalism" of a group of native leaders who deal with the population of Sinkiang within the framework of a policy designed to strengthen their control over all the people living within the boundaries of the province. Foremost among these leaders is the recent Kuomintang governor of the province, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landowner and merchant from the Kulja area. Likewise prominent is Mohammed Emin, an Uighur who studied for several years in Turkey and is counted as one of the intellectual leaders of Sinkiang.[13]

In the view of Masud and Emin, China does not consist of a single "nation" or "nationality" and Sinkiang does not contain fourteen groups of people, whether designated as nationalities or by any other term. They use nationality, however, as the basis for their own classification of the peoples of the province, and define the term with great precision by listing the criteria which in their opinion determine nationality. These criteria are: (1) uniform language; (2) common territory; (3) similar habits and customs; (4) common will; (5) common religion; (6) common race; (7) common clothing, adornments, and other elements like blood relationship. On the basis of these criteria they conclude that the seven groups designated by Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Taranchi, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Tajiks are all of one nationality. In their opinion these groups together comprise the "Turkic nation," despite the fact that the Tajiks do not speak a Turkic language, but an Iranian one.

As Turkic nationalists, Masud and Emin oppose the use of terms like Uighur and Kazakh to represent different nationalities. Actually, they say, the old subgroupings should be redesignated

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 428.

[13] For the views of these men see *Altai*, Vol. I, No. 2, Chungking, April 1945.

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as "tribes," for all their members are descended, like the ancient Hsiungnu and Yüeh-chih, from a single Turkic nation.

The Turkic nation as defined by Masud and Emin would include about nine tenths of the population of Sinkiang. They divide the remaining one tenth into three nationalities: the Chinese, the Manchus, and the Mongols. In the category of "Chinese" they include the two groups designated by Sheng as "Chinese" and "Moslems": Moslem in this context being a synonym for the Dungans, who are Moslem by religion and Chinese in language. In the category of "Manchus" they include the three groups designated by Sheng as "Manchu," "Sibo," and "Solon." They also suggest that the last group in Sheng's list, the Russians, may perhaps form a fifth nationality in Sinkiang, though they are somewhat dubious of this since, they say, the Russians in Sinkiang are citizens of the Soviet Union and not of the Republic of China.

The significance of the thesis of a single Turkic nation is revealed by the anticipated relationship of the "Turkis" toward the Chinese state on the one hand and toward the other nationalities in Sinkiang on the other. This relationship in turn is revealed by the terminology employed by the Turkic nationalists in their demands for elevation to nationhood. In the course of a discussion with Li Tung-fang, Mohammed Emin denies that the "Turkis" might want to become "independent." Indeed, he does not even demand the right to "self-determination" which, as he himself mentions, was conceded to the minorities in China in Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto to the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924. He and other Turkic nationalists ask for no more than the right to "self-government."

While demanding self-government for themselves, the exponents of Turkic nationalism do not seem to concede this right to the other nationalities in Sinkiang. The Turkis, they say, live in every part of Sinkiang. The name of the province should be changed to one which would reflect their dominant position. Disregarding the interests of other groups, they demand that all Sinkiang be officially designated as "Turkistan."

Thus Turkic nationalism displays a dual aspect. It is willing to

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accept a position of subservience to the Chinese majority in the Republic of China, but it seeks to attain a position of dominance over the whole population of Sinkiang. In this latter objective, Turkic nationalists are in competition with authoritarian Chinese; but the degree of political opposition between Chinese assimilationists like Li Tung-fang and Turkic nationalists like Masud Sabri and Mohammed Emin should not be exaggerated. That there exists an area of agreement between the two groups is evidenced by the fact that Masud Sabri was himself a member of the C.C. Clique and was sponsored for the governorship of Sinkiang by that extreme right-wing faction in the Kuomintang.

There exists also, opposing the theories of these Chinese and Turkic schools, the federal idea of devising territorial and cultural arrangements so as to minimize antagonisms springing from racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. Although many people in China and among national minorities would like to live without such antagonisms, only the Chinese Communists have attempted to work out a theory and program of federalism, and even their discussion of the subject is marked by important gaps.

In their discussions of theory, the Chinese Communists have borrowed heavily from Soviet ideas. They start with Stalin's definition that: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture." Following out this definition they conclude that the Republic of China is made up of a number of different nationalities. The Chinese are the preponderant nationality; other nationalities are referred to as "national minorities." Among those specifically listed in the Communist literature are the Mongols, Tibetans, Yi, Miao, Yao, and Hui (Moslems). The use of the term "Hui" here covers all Moslems, without making a distinction between Chinese-speaking and Turkish-speaking Moslems.

Although the Communists are quite specific in defining nationality, they have done little in the way of applying their ideas to specific groups of people. There does not seem to exist any

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complete Communist demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang. Nor does there seem to be, in the Chinese Communist literature, any discussion of the administrative units under which a federative nationality policy could operate. However, a general policy for the multinational Republic of China was proposed by the First All-China Congress of Soviets in 1930 in the following resolution:[14]

> ". . . In such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Kweichow, in which a majority of the population belongs to another, non-Chinese nationality, the toiling masses of these nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic.[15]

The Chinese Communists have since abandoned their Soviet regime in favor of what they call "the New Democracy," but their policy toward national minorities does not appear to have undergone basic modification. Speaking before the 1945 Congress of the Communist Party, Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese "demand better treatment for the national minorities of China, according them the right of self-determination and of forming a union with the Hans [Chinese] on a voluntary basis." Mao's failure to repeat the earlier offer of the right of secession may indicate that he has foremost in mind a union of national states under the formula of a "Union of Democratic Republics."[16]

[14] *The Soviets in China*, Moscow, 1933, p. 440 (in Russian).

[15] In this resolution the Chinese Communists declared for the principle of the right of secession. In his speech of August 24, 1945, recognizing the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic, Chiang Kai-shek also recognized the right of secession, not only for the Mongols but also for other non-Chinese minorities — a striking modification of his views expressed in *China's Destiny* and elsewhere. Thus on the right of secession President Chiang and the Chinese Communists were within reach of at least verbal agreement. Other Chinese assimilationists, and the "Pan-Turkic" nationalists, have not conceded the right of secession.

[16] Mao Tze-tung, *The Fight For a New China*, New York, 1945, pp. 35 and 44.

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The necessity for some sort of federal arrangement is evidenced by the constant armed rebellions resulting from the suppression of local nationalism. The Kulja movement referred to in Chapter III was a rebellion of this kind. It had special significance in the fact that it split the Uighur nationalist movement into two main sections. One section, led by Governor Masud Sabri, and by Burkhan, Mohammed Emin, and Isa Beg, all well-to-do leaders in the Uighur community, took the Chinese side against the Kulja movement. Another group, in which Akhmedjan played a prominent part, supported the Kulja program against the Chinese and their followers. The split between the two groups occurred in August 1947.

That section of the Uighur leadership which most closely identified itself with the Chinese went farthest in the direction of the Turkic nationalism described earlier in this chapter. The Uighur supporters of the Kulja movement found this Turkic nationalism to be an obstacle to their co-operation with other groups. On one occasion Akhmedjan went to some pains to convince the Kazakh supporters of the Kulja coalition that, far from being slighted by the Uighurs, they were receiving more than a proportional share in the coalition.

Although the leaders of the Kulja movement made plain their opposition to the policies of Uighur nationalists like Masud Sabri they did not present an equally clear picture of their own nationalist ideas and objectives. A particularly important point about which full information is lacking is the extent to which their opposition to earlier Chinese rule in Sinkiang led them to accept the federal proposals advanced by the Chinese Communists. It appears that in the early phase of the Kulja revolt the insurrectionists may have had the objective of full independence, as indicated by their use of the term "East Turkistan Republic." After the signing of the Kulja Agreement the word "Republic" was dropped, and as late as October 16, 1947 the representatives of the Kulja group assured the Chinese that they "have never employed direct or indirect, secret or open methods to

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raise the question of Sinkiang seceding from the Chinese Republic." In addition to disavowing any intention of secession Akhmedjan stated that:

> The problem today is to confirm national unity and to put into effect a democratic policy. We do not put the question of the rule of one nation or group of nations over another nation or group of nations. Therefore the national self-government which we desire is supreme authority in our Province under an executive power which is to be effected not only by the Uighurs or those of Turkic race, but also by the unification of all the peoples in our Province and the implementation of a democratic policy.[17]

The demand of even the most militant Uighurs seems so far to have gone no further than the preservation of their own entity within the Chinese state. A key issue has been the struggle for elections free of intimidation by the Chinese, who attempted to cow the people with assertions that "We have the atom bomb," [18] and that "80,000 American troops" would come to establish "order" in Sinkiang.[19] Another demand has been for national courts adapted to the local needs of the population. The issue of the use of their own language also looms large in the eyes of the Uighurs. Item Three of the abortive Kulja Agreement provided that both Chinese and Uighur were to be used in all official documents, and that petitions from the people were to be in the language of the petitioner. Item Four provided that education in lower and middle schools was to be in the language of the student, that the study of Chinese was to be obligatory in middle schools, and that higher education was to be either in Chinese or in Uighur, according to the convenience of the student.

These items suggest the emphasis which Uighur nationalists, like those of other minority groups in Sinkiang, place on their cul-

[17] *Şin Çan Gezeti*, February 19, 1947 (in Uighur).
[18] *Loc. cit.* (in Uighur).
[19] *Şin Çan Gezeti*, Feb. 12 and 13, 1947 (in Uighur).

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*563 tural heritage, and make plain their desire to defend it against
• 186 Chinese encroachment by preserving their own language, literature, and traditions.

Religious freedom is likewise demanded by Uighurs of all political factions. The Islamic flag, depicting a crescent and star on a red background, flies over the schools in Kulja and Chuguchak. After the break between Kulja and Urumchi, the Kulja group was requested by Chang Chih-chung to clarify its intentions by flying the "national colors" over the schools and military establishments.

*563 It is apparent that the nationalist movement among the
186 Uighurs has never gone as far as the militant revolutionary stage
669 reached by the Viet Minh and other radical groups in the Far East. The Uighurs seek primarily a modicum of liberties such as will permit them to continue to survive as one people under a government of their own choosing. Important sections of the Uighurs have shown that they are willing to join with other peoples, even including some Chinese, in fighting for these demands.

The past history of Sinkiang, considered together with the latest uprising in the province, suggests that the demands of the various peoples are not likely to be fully satisfied without at least some measure of territorial as well as cultural autonomy. Just how this can be arranged is something that has to be worked out — jointly, if it is to be done harmoniously — by the minority border peoples and the majority Chinese in the country as a whole. Hitherto, however, the range of disagreement is such that it appears to be impossible even to obtain accord on the demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang!

*563 The problem is not much easier for the scholar concerned
197 solely with describing the peoples of the province. Any classification into nationalities is impeded at the outset by the dearth of information on the national sentiments of any more than a mere handful of nationalist thinkers. Nevertheless, such concrete data as lie at hand do provide some means for objective analysis of the population. In this connection it is particularly striking

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Uighur



fied by the fact that the Uighur language is used by the people who now once more call themselves Uighur, is primarily political in motivation. During the Ming Dynasty, when the Chinese had little contact with the area, they maintained in their translation bureau, the Szu I Kuan, one section dealing with "Moslem" people in general and another with the "Kao-Ch'ang" people of Turfan, who were clearly considered by the Ming Chinese to be identical with the Uighurs. During the Manchu period the population of the Tarim Basin was generally referred to in documents as *Ch'an Hui*, or Turbaned Moslems, and in the Chinese spoken langauge as *Ch'an-t'ou*, or Turbaned Heads. When foreigners first began to penetrate the area in numbers in the nineteenth century, they referred to the population either as "Turkis" or as "Sarts" and to the region as Turkistan. The word "Sart," widely used in Inner Asia, was adopted by the Russians as a general designation for settled people speaking a Turkic language. The word "Turkistan," a Persian expression meaning "land of the Turks," was first applied by Arab geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries to the area northeast of the Syr Darya, was later adopted by the Russians to designate most of their holdings in Central Asia, and was also used as an administrative term for part of Afghanistan. The British applied it to Chinese Central Asia, though the term has never had any administrative significance there, and also designated the population as Turkis.

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At a meeting held in Tashkent in 1921 a small number of emigrants from the Tarim Basin living in Soviet Central Asia demanded that the name Uighur be revived. In 1934 the Provincial Government of Sinkiang accepted a resolution from the Association for the Promotion of Uighur Education for a formal change to this name. A resolution adopting the new name was promulgated in that year under the signature of Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Khoja Niaz, a nationalist leader who had been instrumental in setting up the abortive East Turkistan Republic in the Turfan area in the early thirties. The growing use of the name Uighur is a measure of increasing national consciousness among people

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Uighur



who for several centuries had referred to themselves only as Kashgarliks, Turfanliks, and so on — that is, as inhabitants of a particular oasis.

Since the most important oases are in the Tarim Basin, the major concentration of the Uighurs is south of the Tien Shan. North of the mountains they are few in number and dispersed among other peoples. One reason for the greater mixture of peoples in the north is that the Jungarian Basin has historically served as a migration route. Its present population consists of relatively new immigrants. In the course of the Manchu conquests in Central Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century 30 per cent of the population of Jungaria was exterminated, 40 per cent died of epidemics and other causes, and 20 per cent fled away. In repopulating the region the imperial policy was to mix Uighurs, Chinese, Mongols, and other groups.

The Uighurs who were brought into the Ili region at that time became known as *Taranchi* or "cultivators." In his list of fourteen peoples Sheng Shih-ts'ai separated the Taranchis from other Uighurs; but there is no reason for such separation except to prevent political unity.

In language the Uighurs are uniform except for minor differences of dialect. Uighur is written with the Arabic script, which is no more suited to it than it is to other Turkic languages. So far there has not arisen any significant movement, comparable to that in Turkey under Kemal Atatürk or to that developed in the Soviet Union in the '20's and '30's, for the adoption of a script based on either the Latin or the Cyrillic alphabet. Suggestions have however been made, against the opposition of those wedded to the script in its present form, for the adoption of minor changes. One proposal calls for removing the single most important drawback to the Arabic script by adapting it to the writing of all vowels. Another suggestion is to write as one speaks, but this has encountered difficulty because agreement has not yet been reached on what dialect of the language is to be chosen as the standard.

The linguistic uniformity of the Uighurs is only one aspect of

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1
Mongol
Tadjik



of the Princes over their subjects, but at the same time have steadily increased Chinese control over the Princes themselves. The result of this policy has been to make all progressive Mongols antifeudal as well as anti-Chinese.

Chinese policy has also been to encourage friction between the Mongols and other peoples. Under the long regime of Governor Yang Tseng-hsin from 1912 to 1928 the Kazakhs were provided with arms and were permitted to drive a wedge of expansion into the Altai area in order to separate the Mongols of Sinkiang from their too revolutionary brethren over the border in the Mongolian People's Republic. On the other hand, the Torguts of Kharashahr, geographically separate from other Mongols and close to a region of Kazakh strength, were allowed to develop a well-equipped cavalry force trained by Russian Cossacks who had left Siberia after the Soviet Revolution.

Only recently, with the increase both of nationalism and of the revolutionary trend of nationalism in Sinkiang, have some Mongols and some Kazakhs begun to make common cause. There are sections of both Mongol and Kazakh support for the Kulja coalition and the Kulja program. More revolutionary elements among the Sinkiang Mongols may be expected to look with even greater interest toward the Mongolian People's Republic. No outstanding individuals, however, have been reported among the Mongol nationalists of Sinkiang.

*Iranians* (*Sarikolis, Tajiks*). In the extreme southwest corner of Sinkiang is a group of people who speak an Iranian tongue. They are concentrated in the Sarikol or Tashkurgan Valley, where they form the majority of the population, and appear in smaller numbers in neighboring areas. All told they number only 8800. They are usually referred to as Sarikolis, but were classified by Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai in his list of the peoples of Sinkiang as Tajiks. Recent Russian writers also called them Tajiks, but it is not clear whether they are following the Chinese classification or whether the Chinese adopted a Russian classification.

The Sarikol Valley lies close to the point where the Chinese,

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Tadjik
Chinese



legumes. Despite difficult conditions, the land is apparently capable of supporting a larger population than it does at present. In the T'ang Dynasty, the population was of such a size as to support five hundred monks and a military force of no less than a thousand men. In the last century the population has declined, in part because of slave-hunting raids conducted by peoples from northern India before and after the time of Yakub Beg.

At present the settled population lives in close contact with pastoral Kirghiz. The relations between the two groups appear to be friendly. On the other hand the relations of the Tashkurgan population with the Chinese administration have not been good in recent years. There existed in the area an organization known as the Partisans of the Red Tents — made up of Kirghiz or Iranians or both — which opposed the provincial administration and was friendly toward the program of the Kulja group. Whether the name of the organization is due to a more decided political coloring cannot be ascertained as yet.

### 3. NATIONALITIES WITH NO REGIONAL OR TERRITORIAL BASE OF THEIR OWN

*Chinese.* It is noteworthy that though Sinkiang is a Chinese province, there is within it no significant territorial enclave in which the population majority is solidly Chinese. Ever since the foreign policy of China first penetrated Sinkiang in the second century B.C., the Chinese have intermittently figured among the important population groups in the area, but not as colonizers who displaced the native population from large blocks of territory. In between the periods of their ascendancy they either remained as an alien minority, returned to their homeland, or disappeared in the savage massacres which they often invited by their own misrule.

In the second half of the last century the Chinese were almost wiped out in the great rebellions which shook the whole northwestern section of the Manchu Empire. Since then they have filtered back into the area. With the exception of criminal exiles sent to Sinkiang under the Manchu regime, the Chinese who have

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1
Chinese



*563 631 212 Moslems because such scholarly incentives as exist among them consist mainly of acquiring a modicum of ability to read the Koran in Arabic.

*563 562 779 The influence of Islam on the status of women appears to be somewhat less baleful. Sinkiang Moslem women generally enjoy more freedom than their sisters in Islamic countries of the Near East, and those who belong to the Chinese Moslem community rank high in this respect. The institution of purdah, for example, does not exist among them.

*563 779 ● 186 668 [602] The most marked influence of Islam among the Chinese has been as a political force, to unite those of Moslem faith against Chinese not of the faith. Chinese Moslem society is even stronger in patriarchal authority and clan loyalty than "heathen" Chinese society. The principle that well-to-do members of a clan have a responsibility for the welfare of their poorer distant relatives, as well as advantages over them, is given a heightened authority among Moslem Chinese by the feeling that they form a minority which must keep its ranks closed; whereas among non-Moslem Chinese, the precept is often honored but not conscientiously observed. In times of civil war and peasant rebellion, especially, Moslem war lord armies normally combine military discipline and community loyalty: they are not merely troops and officers, but clansmen and chieftains. Even in periods of widespread peasant unrest, therefore, the leaders of the Chinese Moslem communities are usually able to lead Moslem peasants against both non-Moslem peasants and non-Moslem landlords. Often what starts as a Moslem peasant revolt is taken over by Moslem landlords and converted into a movement to expand the whole Moslem community against the non-Moslem community, and to prevent the Moslem community from being infiltrated either by Chinese nationalism or by ideas of social revolution.

*563 578 186 The essentially nonreligious character of the internecine wars among the two main groups of Chinese in Sinkiang, however, in spite of the appeal to Islam in closing the ranks of the Chinese Moslems, is indicated by the failure of the Moslem Chinese to establish anything more than temporary alliances with their co-

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1
Chinese



religionists of other nationalities. During the great uprising of the third quarter of the last century the Moslem Chinese sided for a time with their Uighur and Kirghiz coreligionists against the Chinese-Manchu regime, subsequently came to blows with their Uighur comrades in arms, and with the collapse of the revolt were virtually exterminated by the Imperial forces. The revolts of the early 1930's displayed the same feature of initial alliance, followed by final break, between Moslems of Uighur and Chinese origin.

If these examples indicate the instability of the religious tie between the Chinese Moslems and others of the same religion in Sinkiang, the harmonious relations which developed later in the 1930's between the Moslem and non-Moslem Chinese demonstrates that under certain conditions the two groups are able to relegate the differences between them to a subordinate importance. It appears then that the Chinese population in Sinkiang is confronted by two possible lines of development. One is to focus around the religious issue all other differences of interest until the process of cleavage results in the formation of two definitely separate nationalities. The other is to subordinate their differences, to the point where religion is no more a barrier to common nationality than it is among Americans, English, and other peoples.

In the past, the precipitant of hostility between Chinese Moslems and non-Moslems within Sinkiang has often been the arrival of reinforcements from outside the province. In every period of insurrection, when war bands of Chinese Moslems from Kansu, Ninghsia, or Ch'inghai (Kokonor) have invaded Sinkiang, the Chinese Moslems of Sinkiang have risen to join them. They considered each other not only coreligionists but kinsmen. Together they not only fought non-Moslem Chinese, but massacred whole communities. When, on the other hand, the non-Moslem Chinese received reinforcements, they were equally savage in their repression of the Dungans. The record in bloodiness was set by the armies of Tso Tsung-t'ang. When they took Uighur towns, surrender was usually accepted without massacre because the

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1
Kazan Tatar



In 1552 Kazan was conquered by the Moscow State, and from this time on the Tatars have been under Russian rule. In 1920 they received autonomous status and formed the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in which they comprise the majority of the population. Considerable numbers of them live also in the Bashkir A.S.S.R. and in the Molotov, Gorki, and Saratov districts of the R.S.F.S.R., as well as in Sinkiang. 563* 174

Before the revolution the main economy of the Tatars was based on agriculture, but many individual Tatars were active traders, especially as middlemen for Russian firms in Turkic speaking areas, such as Russian and Chinese Inner Asia. 563* 241 441

Tatar is a Turkic language and belongs to the northwestern group of this language family. [197]

The Tatars are Sunni Mohammedans. They were converted to Islam in the tenth century. After the Russian conquest of the Volga region, attempts were made by Russian colonizers to convert them to Christianity by offering economic advantages to converts, but success was negligible. 563* 771 797

The older Tatar literature represents a comparatively small body of primarily religious literature. In the second half of the nineteenth century a secular, rational, realistic, and increasingly nationalist trend made itself felt under the influence of Russian culture. In the twentieth century, Tatar literature — like Russian literature — has been strongly preoccupied with practical political questions, and the various literary schools have been political schools rather than aesthetic movements. Today the Tatars in the Soviet Union possess a flourishing literature, strongly influenced by Western forms. The complicated Arabic script which had been such a bar to the elimination of illiteracy was abandoned in favor of a Latinized script which, in the late thirties, was in turn replaced by a Cyrillic script. 563* 779 538 186 212

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feared that this technique was being turned against them when they were warned that, because of Russian Communism, they must not seek friendly relations with Russia even in face of the rapidly increasing encroachment of Japan.

In addition to leftists and liberals, Sheng Shih-ts'ai also enlisted Chinese Communists. These were not concealed Communists; Sheng invited them to enter his service, and employed them deliberately for the sake of their techniques of popular organization, and also as economic and financial experts, feeling sure that he could take the upper hand over them whenever he felt it necessary to do so. When, in his opinion, Russia at the time of Stalingrad had become so weak that he thought it prudent to come to terms with the Kuomintang, he arrested both his Communist and his liberal assistants and tortured and killed many of them, including a brother of Mao Tze-tung. Only at the end of the war with Japan were a few of them released from jail and allowed to go to Yenan.[17]

The men of whom Sheng Shih-ts'ai made use brought with them into Sinkiang the thought, the emotion, the methods of organization and some of the factionalism that had been developing in revolutionary China for more than twenty years. Their scope of action, however, did not lie within a Chinese environment. Whether they turned to the problem of strengthening the state or to the problem of reforming society, they found themselves part of a Chinese minority surrounded by peoples of several nationalities, all of them differing from the Chinese, and from each other, in their responses to social and political issues.

In this situation theories of nationalism and the policies based on them became of more and more importance in determining all political alignments. Among the Chinese, at one end of the scale stood those who considered that they must maintain themselves as the ruling people, treating the non-Chinese as subjects. Next to them stood Chinese who, in contrast, considered themselves

[17] For the foregoing information I am indebted to unpublished notes by Miss Anna Louise Strong of her interviews in Yenan with some of these surviving Communists.

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generous and progressive because they believed that non-Chinese should acquire equal status, as individuals, as fast as they could acquire the Chinese language and assimilate themselves to the Chinese culturally; but this attitude was not accepted as "progressive" by non-Chinese who had their own loyalties to their own languages and cultures. At the other end of the scale stood Chinese who believed in conceding full citizenship to all non-Chinese, combined with independence — including independence in education — in the use of non-Chinese languages, and local self-government based on recognition of the language community rather than on the territorial unit; but while these Chinese were considered liberal and progressive by the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and others, they were considered dangerously radical and disruptive by other Chinese.

Among non-Chinese, the appeal to nationalism also evoked many responses. There were individuals whose hereditary position or political privileges were so closely associated with Chinese rule that they hesitated to approve any change. There were others who wanted, as individuals, to rise to positions formerly held only by Chinese, but did not want to change the structure of government and administration in any other way. There were Uighurs who considered that the Uighurs, as the most numerous nationality, constituting an absolute majority, should take over the province and should have the same rights over minorities that the Chinese had formerly had over all Sinkiang. There were Kazakhs, Mongols, and others who wanted to be as independent of the Uighurs as of the Chinese. And, finally, there were radical nationalists who wanted to change the social order as well as the political structure: to unseat their own Begs, Sultans, and Princes as well as to govern themselves without the Chinese District Magistrates.

All of these groups and tendencies worked out their relationship to each other in a pattern of constantly changing coalitions. In the politics of reform and revolution, coalitions are the characteristic phenomena. They are formed by groups which have interests in common to defend or to assert and which, in forming

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the coalition, emphasize convergent interests and avoid emphasis on divergent interests. The coalition breaks up when one of its component groups has secured the interest that it thinks most essential, and is unwilling to risk this gain by pushing ahead in support of interests more essential to other groups. New coalitions then form, grouped on the one hand around those who wish to stabilize the situation and on the other hand around those who still have unsatisfied interests to assert.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai, in the first phase of his rule, achieved considerable success by building around himself a left-of-center coalition of progressive, radical, and Communist Chinese — together with non-Chinese leaders, to whom he granted more freedom of political action than had ever been granted by any previous Chinese Governor. In the second phase of his rule he tried, and eventually failed, to build a new right-of-center coalition by combining representatives of the Kuomintang, freshly sent in from China, with those of his own followers whom he considered personally loyal to himself rather than to political principles.

After the fall of Sheng and the end of the war with Japan, different factions of the Kuomintang, frequently weakened by purely factional quarrels with each other, formed a series of unsteady coalitions in which they enlisted representatives of the most conservative interests among the non-Chinese, especially the Uighurs and Kazakhs. These Chinese-controlled coalitions were opposed by the Kulja coalition in the Ili Valley and western Jungaria, which rested on leftist and pro-Communist groups among the non-Chinese nationalities, but at the same time sought to maintain contact with moderate representatives, such as Chang Chih-chung, within the right-wing coalition which dominated most of the Tarim Basin and eastern Jungaria.

### *The Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and the Russian Frontier*

In coalition politics of this kind the shifts of allegiance of Osman Bator, the freebooting Kazakh leader, who has been fre-

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after a prolonged struggle with the Khan, who doubts his social status. Side by side with herioc elements the epos contains long and effective lyrical passages, dealing with the love between Er Targyn and the Khan's daughter, Ak Zhunus.

Quite different from the heroic epos are the lyrical tales, which are concerned mainly with romantic subjects of love and suffering. The most popular of these is the Romeo and Juliet-like tale of *Kozy Korpesh and Bayan Slu* which is found in Uighur folklore under the name of *Täji Pasha and Sora Khanim*,[46] and among the Oirats under the name of *Kioziuik*. This is the tale of two lovers who had been promised to each other by their respective fathers before their birth. Because of the death of Kozy Korpesh's father, however, Bayan Slu's father breaks the contract, not wishing to marry his daughter to an orphan. The two lovers are unable to find their happiness together in life. It is only after their death that they can find peace from persecution and on the two adjoining graves arise two bushes which grow together, like the roses that sprang from the graves of Barbara Allen and her lover.

In the nineteenth century, when the Kazakhs were fighting for their independence in a series of risings against the Russians, their songs became the main propaganda weapon for the rallying of national sentiment. Many of the foremost bards also became political leaders, and we have from this period a whole series of songs about the various phases of the struggle for independence.

Contact with the Russians and particularly with the Russian exiles who were sent into the Kazakh steppes made for a great cultural development, despite the Russian policy of denationalization and Russification. This period witnessed an impressive growth of written literature, not only concerned with Kazakh themes, but also containing new themes reflecting the influence of Russian literature and, through it, of Western literature in general. After the establishment of the Soviets and their program of cultural development for the national minorities, the Kazakhs on the Soviet side of the border developed a flourishing young litera-

[46] Radlov, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 236 ff.; A. S. Orlov, *The Kazakh Heroic Epos*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1945, p. 5 (in Russian).

Sinkiang from this time on. Under their kindly patronage a cosmopolitan scholarship developed in the Western Regions, and to it Arab, Khitan, Mongol, Persian, and Tibetan, as well as Chinese, contributed. The vestiges of learned tomes, once impressive shrines, and even whole cities that are buried in the sands of the Takla Makan are evidences even now of this once flourishing native culture.

Authorities of the New Sinkiang have been re-awakening the pride of the Wei-wu-erh people of today on the basis of this ancient kingdom's grandeur, and these Wei-wu-erh may indeed be the modern heirs of the Uighur traditions. Tu Chung-yüan, who is one of those who openly calls the Wei-wu-erh the original settlers of the province, says that they are distributed throughout the south and in much of the north, being especially strong around Ha-mi, Kucha, Kashgar, and Khotan.

One of their principal centers is Kashgar. Perhaps these people are not as strict as some other Mohammedans in their observance of the principles of the Koran, but they do have great reverence for many Islamic rites and observances. They are of the Sunni sect, one of the two great branches into which Islam was split in 645 when the Caliphate was assumed by Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, in the midst of a dispute over the succession which has remained heated ever since. Whereas the Kanjutis across the border in Northwest India are Shias and follow a leader who traces his lineage to Caliph Ali, the Wei-wu-erh of Kashgar are among the most loyal Sunni Moslems in Chinese Turkestan.

The Wei-wu-erh have deep-set eyes and high noses, and Chinese are inclined to group them racially with the Turks. The girls are often exceptionally beautiful, with eyelashes inclined upwards and with jet hair topped by cheery pompoms and quaint petite caps. Maturity comes early in Turkestan, and often these girls marry before they are fifteen. Betrothal is pledged by a girl's father and mother, and the ceremony is performed by the local *A-hung,* or priest. There is understandable gaiety on the occasion, and considerable piping and drumming. The bride finally is borne on a donkey to the house of her future husband for completion of the ritual. If the husband and wife do not prove

SN 668 186 Based on our experience with Soviet Russia, there can be little doubt that the Chinese Communist propaganda has been, or will be, successful in building up a tremendous feeling for nation and nationality, an artificial and overemphasized SN [182] pride for everything which is China or Chinese. The Chinese society in the Northwest might be described as stable and united because of its common history, common language, common beliefs, common pattern of living (agriculture by means of irrigation accounting for ninety-five percent) and common fate. We do not refer to the artificial stability and unity enforced by secret police and military garrisons which might turn into a genuine stability like that in Russia after a long period of propaganda. Training of the younger generation and making propagandistic use of political mistakes committed by other powers, like Hitler's lost war against Russia, which was the last step in SN developing a final and real unity among Russians.

SN 563 795 797 668 Turning back to the minorities, we can say that the Turks and the Chinese Muslims do have a sense of mission in regard to their religion. For centuries the Muslim has been taught to fight and to convert the "non-believers" to the "only true faith on earth": Islam (Mohammedanism). How strong their feeling is in regard to their religion may be seen from the fact that the Communist regime avoids carefully interference in religious matters and even permits every religious activity to continue, including the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of course, the average Muslim is hardly aware of the fact that the top level Muslim leadership is under complete control of the Com- S munist regime. As a religious group the Turks ( Eastern 563 795 Turks, Salars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and some small islamized Tibetan clans) and the Dungans (Chinese Muslims) are united to a certain degree and they do have a sense of common destiny, repeatedly brought forward, when political events showed that they considered themselves one single group, imbued with common fate, which culminated in their idea and highest aim: the attempt to erect their own Islamic Empire and realm, an attempt which cost hecatombs of blood but never came true. Their perception and conviction that the support of their highest spiritual leaders, first the Caliph of Baghdad, then the Sultan of Constantinople and finally the Great Mufti of Jerusalem (in spite of Stalin's and Ata Turk's discouraging denoucement of any Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic movement) developed their group feeling and group conscious- SN ness.

563 As far as the Mongols of the Northwest are concerned, it can be stated that because of their geographical separation SN (see map of ethnic groups) political disunion was inevitable. [795] However, as an ethnic and religious group (the Mongols are

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civilization. The former provinces of Ninghsia, Chinghai, and Sinkiang are China's frontier dependencies. While Ninghsia was part of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang is the homeland of the Turkic peoples, Chinghai forms a transitional area between the Tibetans and Mongols on the southwest and northeast as well as between the Chinese and Uighurs in the southeast and northwest repsectively. Although these borderlands were first brought under China's political control during the Han Dynasty at the beginning of the Christian Era, their political ties to China were not consolidated until recently.

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In order to check Tzarist Russia's aggression towards Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) after her occupation of the Ili valley, China sent an expedition under General Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1871 to reconquer the region and to make it a province under the name of Sinkiang (literally "New Dominion") in 1881.

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In view of Russia's continued southward encroachment from Siberia upon Outer Mongolia and Britain's from India northward to Tibet during the Chinese Revolution at the end of the Manchu Dynasty in 1910-1912, China carved Ninghsia out of Inner Mongolia and Chinghai out of greater Tibet, thereby creating two special districts with Yin-chuan and Hsi-ning as their centers under the provincial administration of Kansu in 1913. By 1928, they were made into two separate provinces. However, quite unexpectedly, following the formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy, the province of Ninghsia was abolished and has been added to Kansu province in 1955. ( In May 1956 the Alashan and Edsingol regions have been detached from Kansu province and incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Precise boundary demarcations are not yet known.) Although

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the political control over these frontier dependencies of Sinkiang, Chinhai, and Ninghsia has been strengthened gradually by the subsequent changes of their administrative status in relation to China, they still remain as "pale" areas in the distribution of Chinese population and culture. That is, the inhabitants of these borderlands are essentially ethnic minority peoples such as Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, Monguors, Khirgiz, Kazakhs, etc. They are non-han Chinese peoples with an increasing touch of Chinese cultural influence and an increasing number of Chinese elements among the various native groups.

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The annexation of these frontier territories to China has brought about an artificial connection between the Chinese and the non-Han Chinese minority peoples, both nomads and settlers. Until now, the natives do not seem to have been influenced much by administrative unity. Not much sympathy is exchanged between the Chinese and Lamaist Tibetan or Mongol; even less

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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between the Moslems and the Lamaists.

As a result of the aforesaid complexity of its geographic basis as well as its intricate historical and political background, the Northwest's population problems are as complicated as its intermingling ethnic composition. For many years , the extreme northwestern province of Sinkiang suffered from continual conflict between China and Russia, although with the introduction of the Communist regime, the conflict seems at least temporarily resolved.

The development of industrialization in present day China is concentrated in the Northwest. New towns have been emerging in barren mountains and in deserts, such as Shih-yu-ho (near Yü-men), Tu-shan-tzu, (south of Wu-su) and Shih-ho-tzu on the western highway of Urumchi between the towns of Manas (Sui-lai) and Ulan-Wusu. The first two sprang up because of the drilling of promising oil wells in the Chi-lien and Tien-shan mountains.

The China Academy of Sciences announced in December, 1955, that in 1956 a number of new research divisions will be established in the Northwest: a Petroleum Research Bureau in Lanchow of Kansu, an Agro-biology Bureau in Wu-kung, Shensi, an Archaeological Research Bureau in Sian, a Geo-physical Research Bureau and a Veterinary Research Bureau. (Jen-min jih-pao Dec. 16, 1955, NCNA. May 11, 1956).

Last November, the Northwest Branch of the China Academy of Sciences held a meeting at which, with the assistance of the Russian Korshekov an ambitious plan was formulated for the economic development of the Northwest in the coming fifteen years, with emphasis on survey of natural resources, study of petroleum and rare metals, exploitation of non-ferrous metals, agronomy, soil science and animal husbandry. In these discussions, the professors of three schools of higher education, the Northwest University, the Northwest Industrial College, and the Northwest Agricultural College, took an active part. (Kuang-ming jih-pao Dec. 13, 1955; NCNA. May 11, 1956).

B. General Distribution and Regional Characteristics.

The Northwest Region has an average density of 28.6 persons per square mile, as compared with the average density of 160 per square miles for the whole country. It has the smallest number in population among all the major regions of China, as the following shows:

| Major Regions | Population (1953 Census) |
|---|---|
| North China | 55,749,000 |
| Northeast China | 41,732,000 |
| East China | 162,682,000 |
| Central and South China | 176,331,000 |

II. The Turkic People of the Northwest

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101 A. The New Uighurs (or Eastern Turks)

The Turks of Sinkiang call themselves after the cities where they live, e.g. Kashgarlik, Turfanlik, Kuchalik, etc.... After [668] the Communist Revolution the Communists introduced the term Uighurs for the Eastern Turks, living in the Ili District. The term 563 later was adopted by the Chinese.

144 1. Physical characteristics

In one sense the Eastern Turks are the descendants of the old [167] Uighurs who migrated to present day Sinkiang during the ninth cen- [175] tury A.D., Later they had mixed with Indo-european tribes and other Turkish tribes of the Chagatai Ulus (empire) and to a small degree also with the Mongols. Thus, in the terminology employed by E. Frhr. von Eickstedt, "Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit, Stuttgart, 1934, the Eastern Turks show many europid and some turanid racial characteristics, and only a slight degree of mongoloid traits.

142 A more detailed description of the average physical type of 141 Eastern Turkestan is as follows: dark hair and eyes, (sometimes 563 lighter occasionally blue eyes), white or yellowish skin with sometimes a slight inclination to brown, middle or tall stature, on the average 1680-1700 mm., with a tendency toward obesity. The head is definitely brachycephalic with a length-width index of 85-87, a longish-oval face, with wide cheek-bones, a straight and rather prominent nose, eyes lacking the mongoloid fold, and everted lips.

2. Economy

433 The main occupations of the Eastern Turks are horticulture, 563 agriculture and animal husbandry. The Eastern Turks breed camels, horses, sheep, and goats. They are famous for their fertile fruit-orchards, which are mostly artificially irrigated. Handicraft is fairly developed, but has no economic significance.

3. Religion

771 The Eastern Turks are Moslems, adherents of the Sun sect. 563 However, they display an attitude towards religion. This does [793] not refer to the leading religious clergy who form a kind of a gentry together with the nobility of the rich landowners.

4. Social organization

178 In contrast to the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, the Eastern 614 Turks have lost their clan system and tribal organization com- 563 pletely. There is no antagonism between the Eastern Turks and 186 the remaining Turkic tribes, although the nomadic Turkic tribes 563 exhibit some contempt of the Eastern Turks. However, there is an old and remarkable hatred between the Turks and the Chinese, due partly to the greater efficiency and industriousness of the Chinese.

563 2. Physical characteristics

142 Racially they are described as Europoids of the Dinaric sub-
[144] division. They have long, small faces with prominent and convex noses, and their skulls in most cases show occipital bulges. Their bodies are slender. Their hair is brown or black, but, in a few cases, also blonde. Their eyes are usually brown, but not as dark as the eyes of the neighbouring Kirghiz.

563 3. History and economic activities

The Tajiks have lived in this area for over two thousand years. Their predecessors were the Iranian people who spoke the Saka
[186] language. Between the Tajiks and the Turks an excellent relationship prevails, but there is an old animosity between the Tajiks and the Chinese.

[241] Due partly to their skilled irrigation system, the Tajiks cultivate oats, vegetables and barley with great success.

B. The Russians

The Russians living in Sinkiang can be divided into three groups. The first group consists of those merchants who maintained trade with the cities of Sinkiang for more than a hundred years and who usually lived in Chuguchak, Kuldja, Kashgar and Urumchi. The
[167] second group consists of refugees who fled Russia after 1918 and became technical laborers, chauffeurs, electricians, miners, road constructors and so on. The third group consists of those Russians
563 whom the Soviets sent to Sinkiang for political reasons. They main-
648 tained Soviet Consulates in all the major cities of Sinkiang and had a very numerous staff. Soviet propaganda had a remarkable influence between 1920 and 1949. According to recent reports of Turkish refugees, the Russians still have military detachments in Sinkiang.

/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

within the railings in the mosque and read the Koran, wear white or green turbans, the leader's turban being more elaborate, with a tassel hanging down the back. Common people wear pointed octagonal caps of white, red or black, the color distinguishing the sect to which they belong.

Some women dress differently from the Chinese women, and wear a sort of turban hat. Ordinarily their dresses are in dark colors, but they may wear gay colors for festivals. According to ancient custom they must veil their faces in the presence of men, but this custom was abandoned long ago.

In cities and towns where the Chinese Moslems dress exactly like the Han Chinese, the men can be distinguished by their physical build and features, but the women are not easily recognized.

d. Occupation

Most Chinese Moslems are business men and traders, and most of them also farm. As farmers they are not equal to the Han Chinese, but they excel in dealing with cattle and everywhere they monopolize the beef and sheep trade. They are also merchants, bakers, workers in jade, money changers, and inn and restaurant keepers.

Outside a Moslem-owned restaurant there hangs a sign displaying a water pot surmounted by a dress hat, and two Chinese characters, Hui-hui. The pot signifies ceremonial cleanliness and guarantees that no pork is used. The hat indicates respect to customers. There are also two Chinese characters on the tea pot, meaning "Pure and True."

Formerly their religion forebade the Moslems to become money-lenders, barbers, fortune-tellers, actors, or servants or apprentices to the Chinese. How strictly the people now observe this taboo is not known.

3. Social values

a. Group spirit

The we-feeling is very strong among the Dungans. The whole group will sacrifice time and money for an individual oppressed by outsiders, and fight for him until justice prevails. Endowed with a courageous nature, the Moslem man is willing to sacrifice his life for the welfare of the group.

This spirit is shown by overt expression in daily social relationships. The Chinese title Lao-piao (old cousin) is applied even to a stranger of the same religious faith. The word old signifies respect; cousin signifies blood relationship. Hence Lao-piao indicates a feeling of closeness toward all members of the faith. Another expression of this feeling is found in the saying that "every Moslem in the world belongs to the same family."

b. Concept of charity

Many of the values in Chinese Moslem society are based upon

/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

S N 563 183 779 431 [651] religious teachings. According to the religious code it is obligatory for a man of means to contribute a certain amount of his wealth to public charity. Next to worship, this is the most important duty in Moslem society. The original idea of helping the poor and needy evolved into a tax (ten per cent on agricultural produce and two and one-half per cent on animals) collected from all believers for religious and public welfare purposes. Another form of alms, the sadaqa, is a voluntary offering. Public welfare supported by the tax, after the collector's fee is deducted, includes freeing slaves, assistance to persons who became indebted for good reason, making holy war to defend the people and the faith, and aiding needy travelers.

S N 563 796 935 During the month of Ramadan (fasting) donations and offerings are collected for public welfare purposes. The amount is not fixed, and the act of giving is voluntary. A sense of public responsibility is strong among these people. Not only do they give regular allowances to the needy in their own communities, but they help needy outsiders of their own faith.

S N 563 788 554 The Hajjis, or those who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca, are highly respected in the Moslem community, and wear special badges to mark their distinction. The opportunity to journey to Mecca is the dream of all Moslems.

c. Virtue

S N 563 577 799 It is important for the individual to cultivate the true concept of peace and submission. The concept of peace involves such ideals as mutual cooperation and aid among mankind, mutual understanding among religions and peaceful co-existance of nations to achieve world brotherhood. The concept of submission means to submit oneself wholly to Allah and follow his teachings, sacrificing self-interest for the promotion of happiness for mankind.

S N 563 515 Personal cleanliness, both internal and external, is most important. Cleanliness in eating habits and personal hygiene is thought to develop a clean soul, free of evil thoughts and immoral conduct.

S N 563 186 d. Racial superiority

The Chinese Moslems regard themselves as a special group, superior to their Chinese neighbors. As students and officials, their attitude toward respect for the emperor and for Confucius has, in the past, been one of compromise. Compelled by law to conform, they excused themselves on the grounds that they did so outwardly but not in their hearts. The old and the new sects of Chinese Moslems, although bitterly hostile toward each other and at times engaged in armed conflict, on the whole present a [798] united front toward the Chinese and the rest of the world.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI1

# ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

## I. The Turks of Sinkiang

186 795 A. The Concept of the Unity of the Moslem World

The Moslems of Sinkiang (Turkic: Türk-e-stan 'Land of the Turks') identify themselves strongly with the rest of the Moslem World. In spite of the many divergencies in national cultures of the various elements which constitute the Moslem world, there is a supernational religious civilization which unifies them all. The feeling and firm conviction of unity of all believers finds expression in the Koran [208] as well as in the traditions and the extensive Islamic literature, and in propaganda slogans which became current since the turning of the century, such as: ittihad ve terakki 'u 'unity and progress', or Muslimlerin hakki birles "Moslim people unite'. The rest of the world is looked at as being apart from the Moslem World - being the domain of war, whereas the area under Moslem jurisdiction is considered the domain of peace.

186 208 795 This feeling may have its roots in the history of the propagation of Islam where political institutions and allegiance went hand in hand with religious institutions and allegiance. The acceptance of the religion of Islam, Din-al-Islam, meant also the acceptance of the Moslem political state. The allegiance with a definite political tinge of many Moslems who do not live today under Moslem control remains with the leaders of the Moslem World. They may feel an even stronger attachment to the Moslem leaders than they do to their own non-Moslem political rulers, as has been the case in Sinkiang under Chinese domination. The allegiance and recognition of the Turks of Sinkiang went to the Ottoman Turkish Empire and later to the leaders of Western Turkestan rather than to their Chinese rulers. It is reasonable to assume that the Moslems of Sinkiang today identify themselves much more strongly with the world of Islam than they do with the Communist block. They think of themselves in terms of being Moslems and not in terms of being Communists. No matter how much indoctrination has gone into uprooting this allegiance to the Islamic world, it will take a whole new thoroughly indoctrinated generation to forget the strong sentiments and attachments to the rest of the Moslem world.

668 B. Turkic Nationalism

Besides having supernational allegiance and sentiments of attachment to the Moslem world, there is also a strong nationalistic movement among the Turks of Sinkiang (called milli tahrik). They consider themselves as being a part of Turkestan as a whole and not as belonging to China. They view themselves as Turks, and not as Chinese nationals. They do not regard their position as a national minority in China as the answer to their national

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 Suppression of external expression of nationalism appears to be an acceptance of the present regime, but it certainly is not to be regarded as constituting the fulfillment of the national dreams of the Turkic people in Sinkiang. The great number of Eastern [167] Turki refugees from Sinkiang testify to the fact that they consider the new regime as much more oppressive than the former Nationalist administration. During the former Chinese Imperial and Republican rule of Sinkiang, no similar mass flight of Turks occurred. The number of refugees alone indicates deep discontent.

563 578 669 186 C. The Traditional Animosity between the Turks and Chinese

The animosity of the Turks to the Chinese is one of the traditional attitudes which became evident in the many Moslem rebellions against the Chinese administration in Sinkiang. The Turks regard the Chinese not only as their oppressors (Turk: gaddar) but also as infidels (Turk: kafir), who have not received the true knowledge about God. While being politically and militarily stronger and superior to the Turks, the Chinese are regarded as inferior by the Turks in culture and faith. Loyalty to the Chinese regime is not strong and is maintained by force and political pressure. We have seen the Moslem reaction to Chinese rule in the past - during the 1860's and the 1930's when large-scale rebellions took place against the existing regime. One may even take into consideration [648] the events that took place in Western Turkestan during World War II. Many of the Western Turkestanian battalions which constituted a part of the Red Army defected to the German Army. They later were organized into special units and joined the fighting against Soviet Russia. At the present, the occurrence of such an event seems unlikely in Sinkiang, and there has been no indication of an organized large-scale rebellion, or any spirited attempts to oppose the existing regime. It is likely, however, that it would be extremely difficult to trust the Turks fully as Chinese patriots. They could not be used effectively as soldiers, since their true loyalty lies with Turkic nationalism in an Islamic framework.

121 779 D. The Conflict of Islamic and Communist Ideologies

Before considering Islam in relation to other ideologies it is necessary to remember that Islam is not to be regarded as a religion only, but also as a social and political philosophy, forming a set pattern for the religious, social and political living of all Moslems. Any political ideology which attempts to enter the domain os Islam has not only to cope with a religious doctrine, but to compete with the ideas of Islam in the realm of politics.

Another important basic conception to keep in mind is the division of the world in Islam into two domains, the first of which is constituted of the believers, who have submitted to Islam - Dar

563 fruit of struggle' there were more landlords and more fruits in the
423 1st hsiang than the 6th hsiang where both the landlords and fruits
431 were few. The laboring people of the 1st hsiang passed to the
565 peasants of the 6th hsiang fruits valued to 400 buckets (hu) of wheat
668 and 3,000 mou (about 500 acres) of rice paddies for distribution. The peasants of the 6th hsiang were deeply moved and wept. The 6th hsiang originally was a Kazakh area. When the Russians, Chinese Uighurs, Mongols of the 1st hsiang...drove carts loaded with fruits to the hsiang, the Kazakh fellow-citizens were so happy that they jumped up and down and ran to the side of the carts. They hugged the Russians and kissed them. They stuck out their thumbs before the Chinese (a gesture of approval) and yelled 'A-k'ang' (i.e. elder brother). They danced with the Uighurs and the Mongols.

At the same time, when the 6th hsiang classified the people, they found that there were 2 Chinese landlords, 1 Uighur landlord and 4 Kazakh landlords. People suddenly realized that the ones
• (186) who had suppressed the people were these landlords, not the landlords of one particular nationality, and certainly not any nationality as a whole..." (Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 24, 1953).

668 This is an excellent example of the way the Communists carry
565 the class struggle across nationality lines. They substitute class
186 hatred for national hatred.

2) "The second stage of land reform in Shu-le County, Sinkiang,
668 involved 20 hsiang and lasted 78 days from December 12, 1952, to
423 March 3, 1953... In these 20 hsiang (during the land reform) we have developed 859 'positive elements,' an average of more than forty people in each hsiang. This laid the foundation for further works....

"Before the confiscation, we called in the rich farmers, the small land lessors and religious leaders for discussion meetings. In these meetings we explained the policy of preserving 'rich farmer economy' and 'freedom of religious belief.' In execution, we definitely carried out the government's policy toward the mosques. Besides leaving strictly alone the land originally owned by the mosques, through consultation between the mosques and the farmers associations, we left a reasonable amount of land to the mosques which had lost their land through confiscation. In the bazaar, we called meetings of businessmen. There we propagated one step forward the policy of protecting business. Throughout the confiscation we did not touch business owned by the landlords.

"We strengthened the work of the United Front. Through the upper level, the religious leaders and people with high prestige and influence among the local mass, we promoted the propaganda of our policy. Hence we avoided the fear psychology which had spread among the landlords to a certain extent. During the confiscation, we firmly carried out the policy of discrimination. We carried out struggled against landlords who stubbornly resisted,

3:Cable & French M-5 (1926) 1927 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang AI 1



hand, Islamism, which had been temporarily repulsed by the Mongols, again closed in, so that Turkestan became one of the strongholds of the Moslem faith.

The trend of political events during the last few years has resulted in movements no less epoch-making than were the invasions of the Mongols and the Huns. A wave of race-consciousness and of national enthusiasm has swept over the peoples of Central Asia and caused them to hearken to any voice which has promised to secure them the liberty and self-determination they so much covet. 'The East is undergoing a concentrated process of adaptation which, with us, was spread over centuries, and the result is not so much *evolution* as *revolution*.'

The situation is pregnant with spiritual possibilities, for the old and the new are struggling fiercely, and that struggle will result in anarchy and lawlessness, unless the hearts of men be captured and re-created by the Christ Who alone makes men free.

The Church Militant is represented in the territory stretching from Suchow to Siberia by *one* Mission Station occupied by *two* men.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

### TRAVELLING IN THE 'GREAT HEAT'

THE trying season known to the Chinese as Ta Shu—'Great Heat'—was upon us. Hami was indeed hot, and Mr. Hunter warned us that not until we reached the other side of the Tian Shan could we hope for any alleviation. From Hami two main trade-routes, known as the Nan Lu—'South Road'—and Peh Lu—'North Road'—run in the respective directions their names